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Abstract
The South African government has set a target of halving poverty by 2014. Using microdata
from the 2005/6 Income and Expenditure Survey, this article frames government’s stated target
of halving poverty by 2014 in terms of speciﬁc measures of the poverty gap and poverty head-
count ratio. With the poverty line as deﬁned here, about half the South African population is
classiﬁed as poor. Even so, the aggregate poverty gap is only about 3% of GDP. Projections of
poverty in 2014 under various growth scenarios indicate that growth alone will be insuﬃcient to
halve poverty by then. It would take average annual growth of 8.7% between 2006 and 2014 to
halve both the poverty gap and poverty headcount ratio with the current distribution of income
and expenditure. However, projections of the eﬀects of a range of growth and distributional
scenarios on poverty, using a new method for simulating pro-poor distributional change, indicate
that halving poverty appears feasible with moderate growth rates and fairly mild pro-poor dis-
tributional change. The results are indicative as to the scale of distributional changes necessary
to halve poverty under various growth scenarios.
Keywords income distribution, poverty, inequality, South Africa.
JEL codes D30, D31, I32.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The South African government has targeted the halving of poverty by 2014, although exactly what
this means in economic terms is yet to be elaborated and a national poverty line is still being
developed, in terms of which government’s target is to be framed. This study uses income and
expenditure microdata to frame government’s stated target of halving poverty by 2014 in terms
of speciﬁc measures of the poverty gap and poverty headcount ratio. This forms the basis for an
analysis of under what growth and distributional scenarios the target could be achieved.
The issues being analysed here have important policy implications. The South African govern-
ment is currently in the process of unpacking what the target of halving poverty means, and this re-
search is thus directly relevant to policy-makers as well as to economists concerned with issues of dis-
tribution and poverty. The projections presented here of poverty under various growth/distributional
scenarios have clear analytical and policy implications.
The existing literature points to an increase in poverty in South Africa between 1995 and 2000,
with the possibility of some reduction thereafter. Hoogeveen and Özler (2005), using a normative
poverty line of R322 per month, ﬁnd that the poverty headcount ratio remains at about 58% between
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11995 and 2000. However, using lower poverty lines they ﬁnd signiﬁcant increases in poverty and
especially in extreme poverty. Hoogeveen and Özler characterise growth between 1995 and 2000 as
not being pro-poor either absolutely or relatively, as real income growth of the poor was actually
negative and was below mean real income growth.
Leibbrandt et al. (2004) ﬁnd a slight worsening of income poverty between 1996 and 2001,
especially for Africans. Simkins (2004) uses several measures of poverty and ﬁnds that poverty
unambiguously rose between 1995 and 2000. A similar conclusion is drawn by Pauw and Mncube
(2007) using the same datasets. Meth and Dias (2004) ﬁnd that poverty worsened in South Africa
between 1999 and 2002, with up to 4.5 million more people falling below a subsistence-based poverty
line, although the increased intensity of poverty is mitigated if the ‘social wage’ is factored in.
Ardington et al. (2005) test the robustness of the general ﬁnding in the literature that poverty
increased between 1996 and 2001 to various aspects of the data (such as missing data), and their
results conﬁrm that poverty did indeed rise.
Van der Berg et al. (2005) using unoﬃcial data (a marketing survey) observe a slight worsening in
poverty between 1995 and 2000, but a decline in poverty between 2000 and 2004. The UNDP (2003)
ﬁnds a small reduction in the poverty headcount ratio between 1995 and 2002. A review put out by
the South African government (Government of the Republic of South Africa, 2008) claims declines
in both the poverty gap and the poverty headcount ratio between 1995 and 2005, and attributes this
decline primarily to government’s social welfare grants.
The generally unimpressive record of income poverty reduction since the advent of democracy in
South Africa highlights the challenge of signiﬁcantly cutting poverty. Countries such as Chile and
to a lesser extent Brazil have made signiﬁcant progress in reducing poverty in recent years, through
dedicated programmes centred around targeting spending on the poor. Halving poverty by 2014 in
South Africa, as per government’s commitment, would arguably require a signiﬁcant shift given the
apparent stubbornness of poverty levels thus far.
Section 2 of this paper quantiﬁes what the ‘halving of poverty’ could mean, by setting out a
monetary poverty line, clarifying two relevant measures of poverty, and by using the latest income
and expenditure survey data to put ﬁgures to the target of halving poverty. Section 3 projects
the poverty headcount ratio and poverty gap in 2014 under various growth scenarios, considering
speciﬁcally whether poverty can be halved through growth under the current distributions of income
and expenditure. Section 4 analyses the eﬀects of various combinations of growth and distributional
change on poverty, and section 5 discusses the broader implications of the ﬁndings. Section 6
concludes.
2F r a m i n g t h e ‘ h a l v i n g o f p o v e r t y ’ t a r g e t
The various datasets of the 2005/2006 Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) were utilised for
this analysis. These are the oﬃcial national household surveys produced by the national sta-
tistical agency, Statistics South Africa.1 All data were inﬂated or deﬂated to March 2006 (de-
pending on when the household was surveyed), using monthly CPI data. Both income and ex-
penditure/consumption are shown in initial analysis, but the subsequently focus is on expendi-
ture/consumption since this is most relevant to poverty. All calculations were undertaken on a
household per capita basis, as elaborated further below.
AsgiSA does not deﬁne precisely what is meant by ‘poverty’ and hence what a ‘halving of poverty’
would actually mean. A process has been underway since 2005, led by National Treasury and
Statistics SA, to develop a national poverty line, and the oﬃcial government targets for halving
poverty are then to be framed in terms of that line. This study therefore uses the proposals contained
in the oﬃcial Statistics SA/National Treasury Discussion Document (2007) as a starting point to
1The original datasets were accessed through the South African Data Archive of the National Research Foundation.
2derive an appropriate line for this study. This is a semi-normative poverty line based on a cost-of-
basic-needs approach. Statistics SA calculates a food poverty line at R2112 per capita per month
(in 2000 prices). This is intended to represent the minimum amount required to purchase enough
food to meet an average person’s basic daily food-energy requirements over a month. Statistics SA
then estimates the non-food component of a poverty line as R111 per capita per month. This yields
a total poverty line of R322 per capita per month in 2000 prices.
Drawing on the aforementioned Discussion Document, this study uses as a basis the lower poverty
line suggested in the Discussion Document (R322 per capita per month in 2000 prices). This R322
baseline was inﬂated to March 2006 levels (using national CPI rates for the lowest two quintiles) for
use with the 2005/6 IES data. This results in the poverty line of R322 in 2000 prices being converted
to a line of R450.48 in March 2006 prices. The baseline poverty line used in the analysis which follows
is thus R450 per capita per month (or R5 400 per capita per annum) in March 2006 prices. Some
parts of the analysis also consider the eﬀects of using the ‘food poverty line’ as calculated by Statistics
SA. This includes only the food items needed to meet minimum energy requirements, and excludes
the costs of clothing, shelter, transport, and so on. This was calculated by Statistics SA at R211
per capita per month (in 2000 prices) which translates to R295 per month in March 2006.
Setting the level of a monetary poverty line answers only part of how to gauge poverty, and
hence how to deﬁne what halving poverty would mean. One way of measuring poverty is the poverty
headcount ratio, and this is the measure that government seems inclined to use to quantify poverty.
The poverty headcount ratio measures the incidence of poverty, which is an important dimension of
poverty. The simplicity of this measure may make it intuitively appealing from a policy perspective.
However, the poverty headcount ratio gives no indication of the intensity of poverty. The actual
incomes of all the people falling below the poverty line do not enter into the poverty headcount
ratio. The intensity of poverty can appropriately be measured not by the poverty headcount ratio
but by the aggregate poverty gap, which sums the gaps between the poverty line and the income or
expenditure of everyone falling below the poverty line.
The choice of poverty measure has signiﬁcant policy implications, particularly insofar as speciﬁc
targets for the reduction of poverty are part of government policy. The poorest people are highly
unlikely to be lifted above the poverty line in the near future, and any increase in their incomes will
have no impact on the poverty headcount ratio. To the extent that success in poverty reduction is
measured exclusively in terms of the poverty headcount ratio, this could de-emphasise raising the
incomes of the poorest people. This is particularly important when, as will be seen below, about
half of South Africans can be classiﬁed as poor. Measuring the halving of poverty solely in terms of
the poverty headcount ratio could imply a focus on the second quartile of the population and not
the poorest quartile.
Given the important shortcomings of the poverty headcount ratio, and the information about
the intensity of poverty conveyed by the aggregate poverty gap, it seems advisable that the target
of halving poverty be framed not only in terms of halving the poverty headcount ratio but also in
terms of halving the poverty gap. The analysis that follows uses this dual measure of the ‘halving
of poverty’, in terms of halving both the poverty headcount ratio and the aggregate poverty gap.
Finally, concretising the meaning of halving of poverty by 2014 requires the speciﬁcation of a
starting point. AsgiSA was however formally launched in February 2006. The 2005/06 IES data
(indexed to March 2006) are used as the baseline starting point for analysing the halving of poverty.
Employing a baseline poverty line of R450 per capita per month yields a poverty headcount ratio
of 52.45% (using expenditure) and 49.56% (using income) in 2006. In other words, roughly half
of South Africans fall below this poverty line. The aggregate poverty gap comes out at just under
R60 billion (R59.65b using income and R59.82 using expenditure). Given that both the income and
expenditure poverty headcount ratios are in the region of 50%, the ‘halving of poverty’ target can
be approximated as involving the following two components:
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3• Cutting the poverty headcount ratio to 25% of the population by 2014;
• Reducing the aggregate poverty gap to R30 billion (in March 2006 Rands) by 2014.
It is worth noting that, although about half the population is classiﬁed as poor, the poverty gap
is only about 3% of GDP.
The analysis of the relationship between distribution, growth, and poverty that follows is based
on how these targets can be achieved. The actual policies that could be implemented to address
poverty or change distribution fall outside of the scope of this article. Rather, the focus is on what
the commitment in AsgiSA to halving poverty means in terms of growth and distribution, and under
what growth/distributional scenarios these targets can be achieved.
3 Can poverty be halved through growth?
In order to establish whether the AsgiSA target of halving poverty can be achieved through distri-
butionally neutral growth, various growth rates are applied uniformly across each of the 47 391 192
individuals in the (weighted) dataset.
Since the poverty line is a monetary poverty line based on the cost of a basket of goods, it remains
constant in real terms. This means that, with any positive growth, there will be reductions in the
poverty gap and headcount ratio, so long as there is not a worsening of distribution aﬀecting the
bottom half of the population.
AsgiSA sets GDP growth targets of at least 4.5% between 2005 and 2009, and at least 6%
between 2010 and 2014. These rates are targets and not projections or forecasts. Realistically it
seems inconceivable that these rates will actually materialise, particularly in the light of the global
economic problems. Nonetheless, we consider how poverty would evolve by 2014 with these rates and
the current distributional structure. Applying AsgiSA-targeted growth rates uniformly across the
distribution to ascertain the eﬀects on poverty means that people gain uniformly in proportionate
terms; in absolute terms the wealthy of course gain many times more than the poor with a uniform
growth rate.
Table 1 shows what the halving of poverty would mean in terms of the poverty headcount ratio
and aggregate poverty gap, for both expenditure and income (a similar table is shown in Appendix
1 using the food poverty line). It also shows how far growth at the rates targeted in AsgiSA could
go in reducing poverty. Growth at the AsgiSA targeted rates would make signiﬁcant inroads into
poverty — cutting the poverty headcount ratio by about a third and the poverty gap by around 45%.
However, even at these unrealistically high growth rates, neither the poverty gap nor the poverty
headcount ratio can be halved with the current distribution of income or expenditure.
TIP curves are utilised here to show both the poverty gap and poverty headcount ratio under
the current distributions of income and expenditure, and subsequently to explore the relationship
between distribution, poverty, and growth and speciﬁcally to assess what combinations of growth
and distributional change would allow for the halving of the poverty gap and poverty headcount
ratio. Derived from Jenkins and Lambert (1997), ‘TIP’ refers to the ‘Three I’s of Poverty’: the
incidence, intensity, and inequality of poverty. TIP curves plot the cumulative sum of the poverty
gaps per capita (y-axis) against the cumulative population share (x-axis).
Formally the TIP curve can be denoted (following Jenkins and Lambert) as TIP(g; p) where p is










n for k ≤ n (with intermediate points derived through linear interpolation).
The slope of the TIP curve at any given percentile equals the poverty gap for that percentile. For
the subset of the population falling below the poverty line, the TIP curve is an increasing concave
function of p, while for people above the poverty line the curve is horizontal (since their poverty
4gaps are zero). Insofar as the curve ﬂattens as it approaches the poverty line, this shows the decline
in the poverty gap as expenditure or income increase towards the threshold.
The extent of poverty incidence, in terms of the poverty headcount ratio, is shown by the value of
p at the point where the curve becomes horizontal. This is shown by the length of the non-horizontal
part of the TIP curve.
The intensity of poverty is shown by the overall height of the TIP curve, since the height of the
curve (at p =1 )is the aggregate poverty gap averaged over the entire population. The average
poverty gap amongst the population falling below the poverty line is given by the slope of a ray from
the origin to (h, TIP(g; h)).
T h ed e g r e eo fi n e q u a l i t ya m o n g s tt h ep o o ri ss h o w nb yt h ed e g r e eo fc o n c a v i t yo ft h en o n -
horizontal section of the TIP curve. If all of the poor had equal incomes, then the non-horizontal
section of the curve would be a diagonal straight line (with a gradient equalling the diﬀerence between
t h ep o v e r t yl i n ea n dt h ea v e r a g ei n c o m eo ft h ep o o r ) .
Figure 1 shows the TIP curve for current expenditure (on a household per capita basis, per
month). The curve plots over 47 million individual points, the cumulative poverty gaps of every
South African (weighted from the original survey data). It can be seen that about half of the
population currently falls under the poverty line of R450 per capita per month. Halving the poverty
headcount ratio would mean cutting it to about a quarter. This target for the headcount ratio is
shown by the dotted vertical line at around 0.26. The mean poverty gap per capita over the whole
population is about R105 per capita per month. Halving the poverty gap would mean bringing it
down to about R53 per capita, and this target is shown by the horizontal dashed line. Meeting the
targets of halving both the poverty gap and the poverty headcount ratio would mean bringing the
point of the TIP curve at which it becomes ﬂat below the horizontal dotted line as well as to the
left of the vertical dotted line.
In Figure 2 below the original TIP curve for expenditure is compared with that which would
result if the growth rates targeted in AsgiSA were to materialise through to 2014, given the current
distribution of expenditure. The pattern of expenditure that would derive from that is shown as a
dashed curve. With the growth rates as hoped for in AsgiSA, the poverty gap is reduced drastically
and the poverty headcount ratio also falls signiﬁcantly. Despite this, it can be seen that neither the
poverty gap nor the poverty headcount ratio is halved. Even in the absolutely improbable event of
the AsgiSA-targeted growth rates materialising, this would be insuﬃcient to halve poverty without
some pro-poor distributional change (in the sense of distributional change that disproportionately
raises the income and expenditure of the poor).
In fact, it would take annual growth rates of 8.7% per annum from 2006 to 2014 to halve both
the poverty gap and poverty headcount ratio of both income and expenditure, with the current
distribution. GDP in South Africa grew at a real average annualised rate of 4.1% between 2000
and 2006, which was higher than for many years previously, and 2.4% between 2006 and 2009.3
These rates were reached during the recent commodities boom from which South Africa beneﬁted,
and which is unlikely to continue in the near future. The global economic crisis has also depressed
growth rates in South Africa, and will in all probability result in a decline in growth rates. Taking
into account actual growth rates from 2006 until the present, the impossibility of halving poverty
through growth alone becomes clearly apparent.
With the current distribution, it would take many years of growth to halve poverty (in particular,
the poverty headcount ratio). Were GDP to grow at an annual rate of 4% per annum, both measures
of poverty would not be halved until the year 2022. With GDP growth of 3% per annum, only in
the year 2027 would poverty be halved. This dramatically illustrates that relying on growth to bring
down poverty would eﬀectively mean that poverty would not be halved for a long time to come.
3Calculated from GDP data published by the South African Reserve Bank, downloaded from
www.reservebank.co.za.
54 Poverty outcomes under alternative growth/distributional
scenarios
4.1 Distributional changes
Having established the impossibility of growth alone leading to the halving of poverty by 2014, given
the current distribution of income and expenditure, we therefore examine what growth-distribution
scenarios could halve poverty by 2014.
There is an almost inﬁnite variety of hypothetical distributional changes that could result in a
halving of poverty. Distributional changes across the entire population are considered in the scenarios
that follow, as explained below. Of course this is not how distributional change occurs in practice,
and it would be very diﬃcult to design policies to eﬀect these outcomes with any degree of precision
(and redistributional changes would of course also incur signiﬁcant administrative costs and other
types of transaction costs).
The concern here is not so much a direct redistribution of income through social transfers,
although this could certainly be a component of distributional change. The analysis is concerned
more fundamentally with an overall shift in the growth path towards more ‘pro-poor growth’, in
the sense of growth in which the incomes of the poor increase relatively more than do those of the
non-poor. The distributional changes simulated here are intended to be indicative of the scale of
‘redistribution’ of incomes and expenditure that would result from a more pro-poor growth path. For
instance, one in which returns to unskilled labour rose more rapidly than returns to skilled labour,
and/or a relative expansion in employment opportunities. Such shift would not result in the exact
distributional changes simulated here; these projections are indicative in nature and are suggestive
as to what combinations of growth and a more egalitarian distribution could result in a halving of
poverty.
4.2 Method for simulating distributional changes
The methodology used in simulating alternative distributional scenarios is set out below with refer-
ence to income for heuristic purposes, but these were undertaken with each of income and expendi-
ture. The method is explained intuitively here, and mathematically in Appendix 2.
We begin by ranking the entire South African population from highest to lowest in terms of
household per capita income. The distributional changes simulated here ‘revolve’ around a speciﬁc
point in the distribution. In the simplest case this is the median income earner. We have also used
the person at the 66.6th percentile (i.e. where a third of people have higher incomes) and the 75th
percentile. This ‘anchor’ point is the only person whose income is unaﬀected by the distributional
change.4 Everyone with a higher income than this person loses from the distributional change and
everyone below that person gains. The extent to which someone loses or gains depends on how far
t h e ya r ef r o mt h eu n a ﬀected person: the highest income earner loses most while the lowest gains
most. The simulated distributional change is generally rank-preserving because of the relatively
small increments spread continuously over a population of over 47 million, with a small number of
marginal rerankings.
In the simplest case in which distributional change revolves around the median income earner,
the change is symmetrical around that point. The loss of the highest income earner is the exact gain
of the lowest; the loss of the second highest income earner is the gain of the second lowest; and so
on. In this case the distributional change is both mean-preserving and median-preserving.
In a slightly more complex variation, the point around which the distributional change revolves
is not the median income-earner (i.e. the 50th percentile), but the person at for instance the 66.6th
or 75th percentile. In these cases the distributional changes simulated are mean-preserving but
4Since weights are being used this is not necessarily an actual individual, but the principle is the same.
6not median preserving, and the distributional change is not symmetrical around the person whose
income remains constant. If for example the change in the distribution of revolves around the 75th
percentile, the gain of the bottom three income earners must be matched by the loss of the top
income earner, the gain of the next three income earners must be matched by the loss of the second
highest income earner, and so on.
One parameter of these transformations is the ‘scale’ of the distributional change, in terms of
how much income is redistributed. The simplest way to think about this is to set by how much the
income of the lowest earner should grow through the distributional change. Simulations have been
r u nh e r ei nw h i c ht h ei n c o m eo re x p e n d i t u r eo ft h e bottom income earner grows by amounts ranging
between R50 and R300 per month. While this would constitute a very signiﬁcant increase in income
for someone at the lowest end of the distribution, the negative eﬀect at the top of the distribution
is but a miniscule fraction of the income of the highest earners.
For example, in the case of a distributional change in which the income of the lowest-income
person rises by R50 and the distributional change revolves around the median, the income of the
highest-income person would decline by R50. The income of the second-lowest-income person would
rise by just under R50 and that of the second-highest-income by fall by just under R50 and so on,
with the amounts falling uniformly from both sides until reaching zero at the median. In the case
of a distributional change of a maximum R50 but revolving around the 75th percentile, the income
of the lowest-income person rises by R50 while the income of the highest-income person declines
by R150, with the absolute amounts declining from both ends (but in larger increments for the top
quarter of the distribution) until reaching zero at the 75th percentile.
An alternative way of modelling distributional changes would have been simply to apply diﬀerent
growth rates to diﬀerent parts of the distribution spectrum — for instance, that the income or
expenditure of the bottom decile grows at 7%, that of the next decile at 6.5%, and so on. However,
such a method is much cruder than the one employed in this paper. The method used here avoids an
outcome where the income or expenditure of the person at the top end of the bottom decile grows
signiﬁcantly more than that of the person just above them at the bottom of the next decile. In the
method employed here, the growth rates vary not by income category (e.g. deciles) but by individual,
resulting in a much more continuous distributional change across the distributional spectrum.
Note that the ‘losers’ from the distributional change, at the upper end of the distribution, do not
actually suﬀer any net loss of income or expenditure in the scenarios set out below, as these simulated
distributional changes are combined with various growth scenarios. The income or expenditure at
the top still grows considerably in every scenario (and far more than other people in absolute terms),
but slightly less than it would in the absence of the equalising distributional change.
This analysis does not model the causal relationships between growth and distribution. It uses
micro-data to simulate distributional changes and to combine these changes with various growth
rates in order to quantify the eﬀects on poverty.
4.3 Projected poverty outcomes under various growth/distributional sce-
narios
Growth rates averaging between 1% and 7% per annum through to 2014 are considered here. While
the upper growth scenarios are not at all likely to materialise, they are included here for the purposes
of comparing various growth/distribution combinations.
We thus simulate the eﬀects on the poverty gap and headcount ratio of eighty-four diﬀerent
combinations of growth and distributional change, for each of income and expenditure. These
scenarios combine seven alternative growth rates (1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, and 7% annual average
growth rates through to 2014) with four diﬀerent ‘intensities’ of pro-poor distributional change
(in which the income of the lowest-income person rises by R50, R100, R200, or R300) and in
which distributional change revolves around each of the median, the 66.6th percentile, and the 75th
percentile. This allows for a consideration of the eﬀects on poverty of combining growth with change
7in distribution that beneﬁts the poor.
Poverty outcomes under two such scenarios are shown in Figure 3 for illustrative purposes. The
solid line shows the expenditure pattern that would result from 6% GDP average growth per annum
through to 2014, combined with a progressive distributional change in which the poorest South
African is just R50 better oﬀ than they would otherwise have been. The dashed line shows a
scenario in which growth is fairly low at 2% per annum but there is a more intensive distributional
change, with the lowest-expenditure person gaining an additional R200 per month (with decreasing
amounts thereafter, as explained earlier). The poverty gap is halved in both of these scenarios (as
can be seen by the fact that both curves lie below the horizontal dotted line). However, while
the poverty headcount ratio is reduced in both cases, this is by less than half (both curves ﬂatten
out a bit to the right of the vertical dotted line). Neither of these particular growth/distribution
combinations is quite enough to halve the proportion of people living below the poverty line.
Figure 4 shows two growth/distributional scenarios in which both the poverty gap and the poverty
headcount ratio are halved. In the scenario depicted with a solid line, GDP grows at 4% per annum,
while in terms of distribution the expenditure of the poorest person is R200 per month higher than
would otherwise be the case. The dashed line shows a scenario of GDP growth of 3% per annum with
distributional change where the expenditure of the poorest person is raised by R300 per month. The
TIP curves for both scenarios fall well below the horizontal dotted line, indicating that the poverty
gap is cut by much more than half (in the second scenario the poverty gap is cut by almost 80%).
Both curves ﬂatten out to the left of the vertical dotted line, showing that the poverty headcount
ratio is cut by at least half (in the second scenario it falls as far down as low as 12%). In these
growth/distribution scenarios the target of halving poverty is thus achieved on both counts.
Table 2 summarises whether the targets of halving the poverty headcount ratio and the poverty
gap could be met under a range of growth/distribution scenarios. While these results are shown for
expenditure, there is only very minor variation for income. The eﬀects of GDP growth through to
2014 at averages of 1-7% per annum are considered. These growth rates are shown here combined
with four diﬀerent pro-poor distributional scenarios. Following the method described earlier, in the
most ‘intensive’ distributional change the maximum gain is R300 per month, which beneﬁts the very
poorest person, with the gains decreasing from there. In the least ‘intensive’ distribution scenario
shown here, the lowest-expenditure person gains by only R50 per month; intermediate scenarios
of R100 and R200 are also shown. The results shown here are for distributional changes revolving
around the 66.6th percentile. For each scenario Table 2 indicates whether or not the target of halving
poverty is met. Since the halving of poverty is being considered in terms of halving both the poverty
headcount ratio and the poverty gap, in each scenario an ‘H’ indicates that the poverty headcount
ratio is (at least) halved while a ‘G’ indicates that the poverty gap is (at least) halved. The eleven
scenarios in which both dimensions of poverty are halved are shaded in.
Even under a (unrealistically optimistic) scenario of 7% annual growth through to 2014, the
poverty headcount ratio cannot be halved without some distributional change. Conversely, even
with growth as low as 2% per annum, both the poverty gap and poverty headcount ratio can be
halved with distributional change in which the poorest person consumes an additional R300 per
month.
4.4 Distributional outcomes under various growth/distributional scenar-
ios
Tables 3-5 show what inequality of expenditure (household per capita) would look like under the
various growth/distributional scenarios. The Gini coeﬃcient of the current distribution of expendi-
ture is 0.67, and without any distributional change this would of course remain the same irrespective
of the growth rate.5 Before considering growth, the last row of the tables shows how much the Gini
5The only reason why the Gini varies across growth rates under a given distributional scenario is that the dis-
tributional changes were implemented after applying the growth rates, so that the value of a distributional change
8would be brought down to under each of the distributional scenarios.
Distributional change in which the poorest person gains an additional R50 per month, with
decreasing gains for each person going up the distribution, would already cut the Gini to 0.65
(for distributional change around the 75th or 66th percentiles) or 0.66 (for distributional change
around the 50th percentile). The most intensive distributional change modelled here, in which the
poorest person consumes an additional R300 per month, could bring the Gini down as far as to 0.56.
While this level of inequality would be a signiﬁcant improvement on current levels, it would still
be extremely high by international standards, bringing South Africa to about the current level of
inequality in Brazil.
Finally, it can be noted that, while the point at which distributional change revolves does not
really aﬀect the impact on poverty, it does aﬀect the overall distributional outcome. As would
be expected, the higher the point in the expenditure spectrum around which distributional change
revolves, the greater the reduction in poverty (for any given growth rate and maximum gain at the
bottom). For instance, under 4% annual growth and with distributional change in which the poorest
person consumes an additional R200 per month, the current Gini coeﬃcient of 0.67 falls to 0.63 in
the case where distributional change revolves around the median, to 0.62 where distributional change
revolves around the 66.6th percentile, and to 0.61 where distributional change revolves around the
75th percentile.
5 Discussion
Some important implications emerge from these scenarios concerning meeting the target of halving
poverty. First, the target of halving poverty by 2014 does appear to be feasible, under growth rates
that are a bit lower than in recent years and with quite mild distributional change. It might be
suggested therefore that this target should not be given up upon or treated as some distant goal
or rhetorical aspiration. This is reinforced by the fact that the entire poverty gap in South Africa
( u s i n gt h ep o v e r t yl i n es p e c i ﬁed here) is just 3% of GDP.
Second, however, it is virtually impossible that the AsgiSA poverty reduction target will be
attained in the absence of a pro-poor shift in the growth trajectory. Realistically, growth alone
will not enable the halving of poverty. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the growth path would
endogenously evolve in a suﬃciently pro-poor way, without active policy interventions designed to
achieve this shift.
Third, these scenarios warn that any worsening of inequality will put the AsgiSA poverty targets
even further out of reach. Given that income and expenditure include non-earnings sources, economic
growth would in itself not necessarily be distributionally neutral in the absence of policy measures to
ensure that the unemployed also beneﬁt. Growth which failed to carry along those in the lower part
of the distribution would not even have the poverty-reducing eﬀects shown earlier for growth alone.
South Africa thus deﬁnitely cannot aﬀord any worsening of inequality if poverty is to be halved by
2014.
Fourth, given that government is still ﬁnalising the level of the national poverty line, the possible
temptation for policymakers to set this too low should be avoided. It currently appears that,
notwithstanding the background research by Statistics SA into the minimum amount which could
be used for a poverty line, government is considering setting it even lower than this level. This
might be motivated at least in part by the realisation of just how many people would fall under
such a line, and perhaps a concern that it would be diﬃcult to halve that number of people within
a reasonable timeframe. One insight that emerges from this analysis is that even middling growth
with no distributional change goes a long way towards halving of poverty by 2014, and with what
diﬀers relative to the post-growth income or expenditure values. Had the distributional changes been applied prior
to the respective growth rates, the Gini would be constant for any given distributional scenario, irrespective of the
growth rate. However, this would mean that the scale of the distributional change would not be identical for any
given distributional scenario, as the growth would also aﬀe c tt h es i z eo ft h ee ﬀective distributional change.
9might be considered fairly mild pro-poor distributional change the halving of poverty appears to be
feasible. While a poverty line in the region of R450 per capita per month (as used in this analysis)
means that about half of all South Africans would currently be classiﬁed as poor, this should not
necessarily motivate the choice of a lower poverty line given the feasibility of dramatically cutting
poverty over the next few years.
Given South Africa’s levels of income per capita and status as an upper-middle income country,
the scale of poverty is associated more with distributional patterns than with the total amount of
resources available. Poverty in South Africa would be far lower than it is, were distribution to be at
anything approaching a typical level of inequality by international standards.
While decent rates of growth could make some inroads into poverty, the scale of poverty means
that growth alone will fall short. Internationally, Bourguignon (2004) emphasises that distribution
matters for poverty reduction, and that comparative international evidence indicates that over the
medium run distributional changes can account for signiﬁcant increases or decreases in poverty.
Highlighting the country-speciﬁcity of this relationship, he suggests that changing the distribution
is likely to be more important than growth for reducing poverty in middle-income and inegalitarian
countries. South Africa is a classic instance of such countries. The simulations of the eﬀects of
various growth/distributional scenarios suggest that halving poverty by 2014 requires a ‘pro-poor’
shift in the growth trajectory (over and above the distributional policies currently in place), such
that distribution becomes less unequal. Conversely, any worsening of inequality will put the AsgiSA
poverty reduction targets beyond reach.
Distributional changes would of course not in practice materialise in the manner modelled here,
but these simulations are indicative of the scale of distributional changes needed to halve poverty.
The most important dynamic underlying actual distributional changes is likely to be through the
labour market, in terms of both employment creation (or losses) and the distribution of earnings
amongst the employed. Social spending certainly has a role to play in ameliorating inequality and
poverty, particularly in the short to medium term. However, South Africa’s inequality is unlikely
to be brought down to ‘decent’ levels — at least to ‘normal’ standards of inequality internationally —
through social spending, but rather through increased demand for low- and semi-skilled labour and
through a closing of wage gaps.
Dramatic improvements in distribution rarely come about without active measures targeted
speciﬁcally at lessening inequality. Moderate decreases in inequality may well materialise as a by-
product of other dynamics. However, the magnitude of the reduction in inequality that would be
required to bring South Africa anywhere in line with international norms is not going to happen
without policies dedicated to that end. The distributional changes analysed here would not even
bring South Africa down to typical levels of inequality for a middle-income country, but to the range
of highly unequal countries such as Brazil.
A stylised fact of distributional changes internationally, at least in recent decades, is what might
be termed a ‘downward stickiness’ of inequality (see Palma, 2007). Increases in inequality are
much less reversible than are decreases. For instance, in countries where a government instituted
conservative economic policies that worsened income distribution, followed by the election of a
government that switched to more ‘progressive’ policies, the distribution of income typically hardly
comes down and certainly not down to the initial levels. Even where the intention is genuinely to
improve income distribution, this often turns out to be far more diﬃcult than anticipated. This
is not surprising, as the wealthy are generally far better able to protect their income than are the
poor, as well as being better placed to reverse any ‘unfavourable’ changes in distribution that do
occur. This asymmetry in distributional changes underlines the point that a signiﬁcant improvement
in income distribution is highly unlikely to materialise without strong policy interventions geared
towards that goal. Improving income distribution is possible, but it takes eﬀort.
With the poverty line as deﬁned here, the aggregate poverty gap is only about 3% of GDP. This
suggests that poverty in South Africa should not be viewed as an insurmountable problem. In fact,
given that half of the population falls below that line, 3% of GDP is a comparatively small amount,
10and is smaller than what might have been expected before analysing the data. Of course the actual
cost of eliminating poverty would signiﬁcantly exceed this amount if considered in terms of direct
transfers (given issues of targeting and administration).
Nonetheless, considering the huge scale of poverty in terms of its incidence, in conjunction with
the rather small scale when considered in terms of GDP, the feasibility of dramatic reductions in
poverty is suggested. If this proves intractable through a shift in the growth path, direct transfers
could prove eﬀective (as they have been in the case of Brazil). The extreme levels of inequality
in South Africa would seem to suggest that there is considerable scope for pro-poor distributional
change.
In this vein it might be suggested that the reduction of inequality be placed as a more central
and explicit goal of government policy than is currently the case, both for its own sake and in order
to signiﬁcantly reduce poverty. Whether the reduction of inequality is a desirable goal in its own
right is obviously a political issue. An associated consideration, if indeed the reduction of inequality
is a public policy objective, is how strongly and in what ways this is to be pursued insofar as there
are tensions between this and other policy goals.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This study has investigated how poverty rates in South Africa might evolve under various combi-
nations of growth and distributional change. Speciﬁcally, it evaluates whether the target set by
the South African government of halving poverty by 2014 can be achieved through growth alone.
This target has not yet been fully ﬂeshed out, but it is proposed here that it be deﬁn e di nt e r m s
of both the poverty gap and the poverty headcount ratio, and an updated monetary poverty line
was set out here. The target of halving poverty by 2014 was thus concretised here as cutting the
poverty headcount ratio to a quarter of the population and reducing the aggregate poverty gap to
R30 billion (in March 2006 Rands). With the current distribution of income and expenditure, these
targets cannot be reached even were the highly ambitious growth goals set by government before the
economic crisis to materialise. Simulations indicate that relying on growth alone, were the current
distributional structure to remain, would mean that poverty would only be halved by the year 2027
under growth rates of 3% per annum or by 2022 under growth rates of 4% per annum.
This underlines the imperative of pro-poor distributional change if poverty is to be halved by 2014.
Scenarios combining various growth scenarios with a range of simulations of pro-poor distributional
change point to the feasibility of halving poverty by 2014. For instance, with growth rates of 2%
combined with distributional change in which the poorest person can consume a maximum of R300
more per month, or alternatively growth of 4% per annum combined with distributional change where
the poorest person consumes a maximum of R200 more per month. Inequality in South Africa is
extremely high by international standards. If policymakers in South Africa are serious about halving
poverty, active interventions would be needed to avoid any worsening of inequality and actually to
reduce inequality — speciﬁcally, the shares of income and expenditure going to the bottom half of
the population. Finally, the method developed here for simulating distributional changes could be
applied to investigating the impact of various combinations of growth and pro-poor distributional
change in other countries.
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12Table 1: Poverty projections under alternative growth scenarios 
 
  Poverty headcount ratio (%)  Poverty gap (R billion) 
Expenditure:     
2006 actual  52.46  59.82 
Target: halving poverty  26.23  29.91 
Growth at AsgiSA targeted rates  34.33  32.00 
     
Income:     
2006 actual  49.57  59.65 
Target: halving poverty  24.79  29.83 
Growth at AsgiSA targeted rates  33.75  33.98 
 
 
Table 2: Meeting of poverty targets under alternative growth/distribution scenarios 
 
  Distribution 
  R300  R200  R100  R50  None 
Growth           
7%  H, G  H, G  H, G  - ,G  - ,G 
6%  H, G  H, G  - ,G  - ,G  - ,G 
5%  H, G  H, G  - ,G  - ,G  -, - 
4%  H, G  H ,G  - ,G  -, -  -, - 
3%  H, G  - ,G  - ,G  -, -  -, - 
2%  H, G  - ,G  -, -  -, -  -, - 
1%  - ,G  - ,G  -, -  -, -  -, - 
Notes: 
Growth refers to the average annualised growth rate between 2006 and 2014 under the various scenarios. 
Distribution refers to the distribution scenarios as set out in the text. R300 means that the expenditure of the lowest-income person is R300 
per month higher than it would otherwise have been (with amounts decreasing from there as income rises); similarly for R200, R100, and 
R50. 
For each scenario (growth/distribution combination), H means that the poverty headcount ratio is at least halved and G indicates that the 
poverty gap is at least halved; the symbol – means that those measures are not halved. 
 
 
Table 3: Distributional change around 50
th percentile 
 
  Distribution 
  R300  R200  R100  R50  None 
Growth           
7%  0.62  0.64  0.65  0.66  0.67 
6%  0.62  0.64  0.65  0.66  0.67 
5%  0.61  0.63  0.65  0.66  0.67 
4%  0.61  0.63  0.65  0.66  0.67 
3%  0.61  0.63  0.65  0.66  0.67 
2%  0.60  0.62  0.65  0.66  0.67 
1%  0.59  0.62  0.64  0.66  0.67 
-  0.59  0.62  0.64  0.66  0.67 
Note: Expenditure inequality, measured with Gini coefficient. 
 
13Table 4: Distributional change around 66.6
th percentile 
 
  Distribution 
  R300  R200  R100  R50  None 
Growth           
7%  0.61  0.63  0.65  0.66  0.67 
6%  0.60  0.62  0.65  0.66  0.67 
5%  0.60  0.62  0.65  0.66  0.67 
4%  0.59  0.62  0.64  0.66  0.67 
3%  0.58  0.61  0.64  0.66  0.67 
2%  0.58  0.61  0.64  0.65  0.67 
1%  0.57  0.60  0.64  0.65  0.67 
-  0.56  0.60  0.63  0.65  0.67 
Note: Expenditure inequality, measured with Gini coefficient. 
 
 
Table 5: Distributional change around 75
th percentile 
 
  Distribution 
  R300  R200  R100  R50  None 
Growth           
7%  0.60  0.62  0.65  0.66  0.67 
6%  0.59  0.62  0.64  0.66  0.67 
5%  0.59  0.61  0.64  0.66  0.67 
4%  0.58  0.61  0.64  0.65  0.67 
3%  0.57  0.61  0.64  0.65  0.67 
2%  0.57  0.60  0.64  0.65  0.67 
1%  0.56  0.59  0.63  0.65  0.67 
-  0.55  0.59  0.63  0.65  0.67 
Note: Expenditure inequality, measured with Gini coefficient. 
 
Figure 1: TIP curve of expenditure 
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APPENDIX 1: RESULTS USING FOOD POVERTY LINE 
 
Table A1 shows what halving of poverty would mean in terms of the food poverty line, and what 
poverty rates can be projected for 2014 using this line under alternative growth scenarios with the 
current distribution of expenditure and income respectively. 
 
Table A1: Poverty projections [using food poverty line] under alternative growth scenarios 
 
  Poverty headcount ratio (%)  Poverty gap (R billion) 
Expenditure:     
2006 actual  34.36  21.02 
Target: halving poverty  17.18  10.51 
Growth at AsgiSA targeted rates  17.52  8.76 
     
Income:     
2006 actual  33.86  22.31 
Target: halving poverty  16.93  11.16 
Growth at AsgiSA targeted rates  18.57  10.57 
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16Figure A1 shows the TIP curve using the food poverty line (set at R295 per capita per month). Using 
this lower line means that the poverty headcount ratio is significantly lower, at around 34% of the 
population. Furthermore, the poverty gap is significantly lower, just about R36 per capita per month 
when averaged over the entire population. The dotted horizontal and vertical lines show what the 
targets for halving the poverty gap and headcount ratio are, respectively, if the food poverty line is 
used. 




Food poverty line set at R295, as discussed in the main text. 
A different scale is used in this case as from the other TIP curves (in Figures 1-4). 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: METHOD USED FOR SIMULATING DISTRIBUTIONAL CHANGES 
 
To set out the method described in section 4 more formally, let xi  denote the income or expenditure of 
person i where the population is ranked from lowest to highest in terms of variable x, for i = 1,2,…,n. 
That is, x1 is the lowest income or expenditure and xn the highest. Note that this ranking will differ for 
income and for expenditure. In this analysis, n = 47 391 192. 
Select   ,  the  point  around  which  the  distributional  change  will  revolve.  For  symmetrical 
distributional change around the median,  n 5 . 0   ; for distributional change around the person at for 
example the 75
th percentile,  n 75 . 0   . 
 
Let  i   be the value of the distributional change affecting person i such that: 
0 i    for    i ; 
0 i    for    i ; and 
0 i    for    i . 
 
Select  , the value of the gain to the person with the lowest income or expenditure [i=1]. 
The range of values to be redistributed will be: 
 
     i   where     is  the  maximum  loss  to  the  person  with  the  highest  income  or 
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17For the special case of distributional change revolving around the median ( n 5 . 0   ), 
 
    ; 
 
while for distributional change around points higher than the median (e.g.  n 75 . 0   ), 
 
   . 
















  . 
 
It can be seen that for the poorest person, the distributional gain will be the full value of the maximum 
distributional change,   , while for the person just below the unaffected person (e.g. immediately 
below the median person in the simplest case) the distributional gain will be positive but close to zero. 




















  . 
 
This  is  a  general  expression  which  mathematically  balances  the  aggregate  loss  to  upper-income 
earners with the aggregate gain to lower-income earners who gain from distributional change, no 
matter around which point the distributional change revolves. 
 
Note that in this exposition we have selected the maximum gain to the person with the lowest income 
or expenditure [i=1], , then calculated the gain to the other people in subset    i ; this allowed for 
the derivation of the loss to the people in subset    i . The method could equally have begun by 
selecting the loss to the person with the highest income or expenditure [i=n],   , and calculating 
    i i  and thence deriving      i i ; the results would be identical. 
 
The post-distributional-change income of person i will thus be: 
 




. ~ ; ~ ; ~            i x x and i for x x i x x i i i i i i  
18